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4 April 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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*USSR: A leading Soviet scientist, N. V. Pushkov, [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] stated in Paris on 30 March that the USSR hopes, through the program of satellite launchings beginning with Sputnik XIII, to catch up with the US in the investigation of scientific phenomena in space. The USSR lags in this aspect of its space program because it has concentrated on "spectacular attempts for public consumption," according to Pushkov, who is head of the Moscow Institute of Geomagnetism, Ionosphere, and Radio Wave Propagation. He stated that the mission of Sputnik XIII, which was launched on 16 March and is still in orbit, is the study of basic wave propagation through the ionosphere. Pushkov's statements provide no basis for confirming or denying earlier US estimates that Sputnik XIII might have photoreconnaissance capabilities. [redacted]

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[redacted] Pushkov's statements support the judgment that Sputnik XIII's payload is smaller in size than the Vostok vehicle used in the Soviet manned space flight program. Such smaller payloads have been anticipated for geophysical research as well as military development purposes. [redacted]

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*Syria: Syrian army factions have managed to compromise their differences, and the military command in Damascus announced on 3 April that order had been restored and that army units and officers in Aleppo had returned to their barracks. The pro-Nasir officers' group, whose main strength is in Aleppo and other northern cities, apparently decided to accept a negotiated settlement after Cairo radio had broadcast a statement

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by President Nasir appealing to Syrians to avoid civil war and making it clear that Egyptian forces would not be sent unless other outside forces intervened.

The pressures exerted on the military command during the past few days by military supporters of the conservative Qudsi government, as well as by pro-Nasir elements, have forced an almost complete change in the command's structure and personnel. Seven members of the military command--those who played a key role in the army's assumption of power on 28 March and who apparently resisted the idea of a major rapprochement with Egypt--have been pensioned and sent out of the country.

The revised structure of the command reportedly provides for a central, decision-making body composed of representatives from the various area commands. As the most important instrument of government in Syria, this body is likely to be the focal point of new rivalries. An agreement among the army factions calls for reinstitution of civilian government, and Qudsi may be reinstated as President.

Syria can now be expected to move toward a closer relationship with Egypt short of a return to union.

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Laos:

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expressed the opinion that Souvanna could not achieve a policy of strict neutrality because of the extreme leftists who had attached themselves to the Xieng Khouang regime.

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additional evidence of serious friction between neutralist and pro-Communist elements in Souvanna's

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[] camp. Souvanna's departure on 3 April for an indefinite stay in France will provide the Communists a further opportunity to increase their influence in Xieng Khouang.]

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Communist China - Disarmament: Taking note of the stalemate at the disarmament conference in Geneva, Peiping on 3 April published an editorial which makes clear the regime's continuing reservations regarding disarmament negotiations with the US, from which Communist China is excluded. The editorial reiterates Peiping's long-standing qualification that the Chinese Communist regime will not be bound by any disarmament agreement reached without its participation. While the Chinese, for the record, endorse Soviet disarmament proposals, they insist that as a practical matter disarmament is virtually impossible, since US national policy is "committed to armament." Contrary to the line taken by Moscow, Peiping argues that undue stress on disarmament weakens revolutionary ardor, and that it is necessary to strengthen national liberation movements in order to achieve practical results in the struggle for disarmament.]

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(Backup, Page 1)

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South Vietnam: [Since the air attack on President Diem's palace in late February, high civilian and military officials in Saigon have become increasingly concerned over the danger of a struggle for power if Diem dies in office. Three separate groups are now reported to be lining up supporters in the administration and the armed forces in preparation for a take-over in any emergency. This activity could lead to increased factionalism in the government and stimulate plotting to overthrow Diem.] (Backup, Page 2)

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Argentina: President Guido has made a bid to the Peronists and other political groups to discuss steps to resolve the crisis without violence. The Peronists, who have threatened to fight to retain their recent electoral gains, reportedly believe that they can negotiate with the armed forces, despite the military's determination to prevent a resurgence of Peronista political power. Neither the Peronists nor the armed forces have gone so far as to issue formal statements on their most extreme demands. The majority of the armed forces--who consider their recent ouster of Frondizi misunderstood abroad--prefer constitutional government, and an increasing number of officers realize that some accommodation with the Peronistas must be reached to avoid civil disorder.

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
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Chinese Communist Attitude Toward Disarmament

Chinese Communist opposition to general disarmament and to related issues such as a nuclear test ban has been a major irritant in Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese advance the thesis that general disarmament is impossible until the Communist movement has gained complete victory throughout the world and that Soviet emphasis on disarmament before that time does serious damage to the revolutionary spirit of the Communist movement. Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese view disarmament negotiations with the West as useful only for propaganda purposes. Furthermore, they fear that any Soviet accommodation with the West on disarmament will both weaken the military strength of the Communist bloc and hamper China's opportunities to become a full-fledged nuclear power.

These points have been debated in public and in closed Communist and international front forums throughout the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The latest clashes have centered around Peiping's accusation that Moscow has subordinated national liberation struggles to the pursuit of general disarmament. The Chinese apparently believe that this line of attack weakens Khrushchev's influence with militant nationalists in colonial areas, who incline to Peiping's views on the necessity of vigorous exploitation of revolutionary situations.

On the related issue of nuclear testing, Peiping has indicated that it reserves the right to test until there is international agreement on the complete banning of nuclear weapons. Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated last October that when China has nuclear weapons the "question of peace will be settled," and, in sharp contrast to increasing Soviet emphasis on the issue of nondissemination of nuclear weapons, he added that when more countries possess atomic weapons the chance of war will be lessened.

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South Vietnam

[President Diem's concentration of administrative authority in his own hands, his suppression of political opposition, and the shortage of trained administrative talent have left South Vietnam without a strong alternative anti-Communist leadership. Despite considerable sentiment for a coup, most critics continue to seek means to bring about reforms within the framework of Diem's rule; one group, which nearly succeeded in ousting Diem in November 1960, lost control when it tried to negotiate with him rather than force him out.]

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[one of the three groups now maneuvering to take over in the event of Diem's death centers around Under Secretary of Defense Thuan and Presidential Security Service Director Tuyen. It has considerable support within the cabinet and from some military figures, including the commander of the southern military zone. It also has the tacit approval of Diem's brother Nhu. Another group, headed by Field Commander General Duong Van Minh, who has wide military following particularly among junior officers, apparently is determined to assure the constitutional succession of Vice President Tho. A third faction, led by Chief of Staff Brig. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, has the support of two division commanders and the Civil Guard commander, but it probably lacks widespread backing and may eventually join one of the other groups.]

[The February attempt to assassinate Diem prompted a ranking South Vietnamese general to comment that Diem's sudden death could bring the country to chaos. He expressed concern over the arming and training of various civilian groups--civil servants, women, "people's forces" in the plateau area, and the Republican Youth Corps--in areas of heavy Communist influence and said he felt such groups would be difficult to control during a national crisis.]

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